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Abstract—Transmitter-side channel state information (CSI) of
the legitimate destination plays a critical role in physical layer
secure transmissions. However, channel training procedure is
vulnerable to the pilot spoofing attack (PSA) or pilot jamming
attack (PJA) by an active eavesdropper (Eve), which inevitably
results in severe private information leakage. In this paper,
we propose a random channel training (RCT) based secure
downlink transmission framework for a time division duplex
(TDD) multiple antennas base station (BS). In the proposed
RCT scheme, multiple orthogonal pilot sequences (PSs) are
simultaneously allocated to the legitimate user (LU), and the LU
randomly selects one PS from the assigned PS set to transmit.
Under either the PSA or PJA, we provide the detailed steps
for the BS to identify the PS transmitted by the LU, and
to simultaneously estimate channels of the LU and Eve. The
probability that the BS makes an incorrect decision on the PS
of the LU is analytically investigated. Finally, closed-form secure
beamforming (SB) vectors are designed and optimized to enhance
the secrecy rates during the downlink transmissions. Numerical
results show that the secrecy performance is greatly improved
compared to the conventional channel training scheme wherein
only one PS is assigned to the LU.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, channel estimation, pilot
spoofing attack, jamming attack, secure transmission.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the openness of the wireless environments, wireless
signals are vulnerable to be intercepted by a malicious eaves-
dropper (Eve). Since the pioneering work in [1], physical layer
security (PLS) approach has attracted increasing attention and
has been regarded as an important complement to traditional
cryptography techniques to protect the secrecy of wireless
transmissions [2], [3]. Recently, by exploiting the extra spatial
degrees of freedom provided by multiple antennas, multiple-
input and multiple-output (MIMO) techniques have been ap-
plied to PLS to further enlarge the secrecy capacity [2], [4].
Exploiting multiple antennas to facilitate PLS, secure beam-
forming (SB) and artificial noise (AN) aided transmission
are two well-known approaches that have been extensively
investigated in various contexts, e.g., in point to point MIMO
systems [5]–[7], in cooperative/relay systems [8]–[11], and in
multi-cell and massive MIMO systems [12]–[15]. In all these
works, transmitter-side channel state information (CSI) is of
great importance in designing SB and AN signals. In practice,
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CSI is usually obtained by channel training, i.e., transmitting
previously known pilot sequence (PS) for channel estimation.
However, in most of existing works on the design of SB and
AN signals, the transmitter-side CSI is directly assumed in
perfect or imperfect forms, without considering the channel
training phase.
In fact, intelligent active Eve can greatly improve its wire-
tapping performance by attacking the channel training phase
of legitimate links, e.g., pilot spoofing attack (PSA) and pilot
jamming attack (PJA). In PSA, Eve transmits the same PS as
the legitimate user (LU) during the channel training phase.
As a result, the channel estimation at the BS becomes a
combination of the LU’s and Eve’s channels, and the designed
beamforming vector is directed to both the LU and Eve,
which results in serious private information leakage [16]. In
PJA, Eve transmits randomly generated interference to reduce
the accuracy of the channel estimation. As proved in [21],
if Eve jams the channel training phase of a legitimate link,
then the secure degree of freedom (SDOF) drops to zero. In
viewing of the severe threat posed by these attacks, in this
paper, we investigate how to overcome the PSA and PJA
during the channel training phase and to achieve secure data
transmissions via multiple antennas.
A. Related works
1) Detection of PSA: Many works have been focused on
detecting the PSA [22]–[26]. In [22], a phase-shift keying
based random training scheme was proposed to detect the PSA.
The authors of [23] proposed to compare the signal power
received at the base station (BS) and the LU to determine
whether a PSA exists. A generalized likelihood ratio based
hypothesis testing method is derived in [24] to detect the PSA.
In [25], [26], the PS was transmitted along with randomly
generated binary sequences, and the PSA can be detected by
checking the rank of the signal space. Though these works
showed good performance on detecting the PSA, they did not
provide a method to combat with it.
2) Secure transmission under PSA: Secure transmission
under the PSA was investigated in [27]–[29]. In [27], a method
utilizing the channel reciprocity of time division duplex (TDD)
systems was developed to estimate the channels of the LU
and Eve, based on which, SB was designed to protect data
transmissions. The main drawback of this scheme is that it
requires an extra downlink training procedure which reduces
the spectrum efficiency. In [28], the authors proposed a two-
stage channel training scheme to detect the PSA and estimate
the legitimate and illegitimate channels for SB design. How-
ever, the orthogonality of the PSs may be destroyed because
2different powers are used to transmit different parts of the PS,
which means the scheme may only suit to single-user systems.
In [29], the authors combated with the PSA by utilizing the
different spatial channel statistics of the LU and Eve. However,
we observe that in [29], Eve can always transmit the same PS
as the LU, which means that the estimation of the legitimate
channel (the channel of the LU) is always contaminated by
the illegitimate channel (the channel of Eve), and thus is of
low accuracy.
3) Secure transmission under PJA: Jamming attack and its
countermeasures were investigated in [17]–[20]. As shown in
[17], by properly allocating the jamming power during the
channel training and data transmission phase, the spectral
efficiency can be significantly degraded by a smart jammer.
In [18], a GLLR based method was proposed to detect the
jamming attack. The authors of [19] proposed to retransmit the
PS to improve the accuracy of the channel estimation when the
detected jamming power is large. In [20], the author proposed
to estimate the jamming channel by exploiting a purposely
unused PS, and it was shown that with the estimated jamming
channel, the average transmission rates were greatly increased.
Though these works have made great contributions on elim-
inating the effects of the jamming signals and enhancing the
reliability of the received signals at the legitimate receiver,
they did not consider the private information leakage at the
malicious Eve due to the contaminated channel estimation.
To our knowledge, the research to ensure secure downlink
transmission under PJA is still sparse. It was shown in [21]
that PJA during the channel training phase will drive the SDOF
to zero. To combat with PJA, the authors proposed to share the
PS between the BS and the LU secretly through a cryptography
key-based method, which violated the basic principle of the
PLS.
B. Motivations and Contributions
Motivated by the severe threat posed by the PSA and PJA
during the channel training phase, in this paper, we propose
a framework for secure downlink transmissions in a multiple-
antenna TDD system, incorporating uplink channel training,
channel estimation and downlink secure beamforming design.
More specifically, we propose a random channel training
(RCT) scheme which is capable of combating with both the
PSA and PJA. Different from conventional channel training
scheme wherein each user is assigned with only one PS, e.g.,
in [12] and [13], the RCT scheme simultaneously assigns
multiple orthogonal PSs to the LU that is under attack. During
the channel training phase, the LU randomly chooses one
PS from the assigned PS set to transmit. Neither Eve nor
the BS knows which PS will be transmitted by the LU.
After receiving the training signals, the BS can distinguish
the PS of the LU by exploiting the spatial channel statistics.
Then simultaneous estimation of the legitimate and illegitimate
channels is performed, and finally the SB vector is designed
and optimized accordingly to maximize the average secrecy
rate. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized
as follows:
• We propose a RCT scheme for the uplink channel training
to combat with both the PSA and PJA. The RCT scheme
is capable of simultaneously estimating the legitimate and
illegitimate channels. We provide corresponding method for
the BS to identify which PS is transmitted by the LU,
without requiring any key-based information exchange. The
error decision rate (EDR), defined as the probability that the
BS makes an incorrect decision on the PS of the LU, has
also been investigated, and tractable analytical expressions
are derived for numerical evaluations.
• The SB vector is designed and optimized to improve the
secrecy rate. Under the PSA, we obtain a tractable ap-
proximation of the average secrecy rate, which takes the
channel estimation errors into consideration. Closed-form
SB vector is derived which maximizes the approximate
average secrecy rate. Under the PJA, we limit the signal
leakage to Eve by only transmitting the signals on the null-
space of the estimated illegitimate channel direction, and
closed-form SB vector which maximizes the average SNR
of the LU is also obtained.
• Analytical and numerical results show that the EDR of the
proposed RCT scheme is very low. The proposed framework
greatly increases the secrecy rate during the downlink data
transmission phase, compared with the existing schemes.
Besides, the scheme can also be flexibly applied to multi-
user downlink transmissions.
C. Paper Organization and Notations
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, the proposed RCT scheme and the attacking schemes of
Eve are introduced. In Section III–Section V, we introduce
the uplink channel training, channel estimation and downlink
secure beamforming design under the PSA, respectively, in
details. In Section IV, the counterpart to PJA is discussed.
Numerical results are provided in Section VII. In Section VIII,
we conclude the paper.
Notations:(·)H denotes the hermitian transpose. In denotes
a n-by-n identity matrix. |·| denotes the determinant, the
absolute value or the cardinality. ‖·‖ denotes the l2 norm.
P {·} and E {·} denote the probability and mathematical
expectation. CN×M denotes the space of N -by-M complex-
valued matrices. CN (ν,Σ) with ν ∈ Cn×1 and Σ ∈ Cn×n,
E (λ), and G (α, β) represent the complex-valued Gaussian
distribution, the exponential distribution, and the Gamma
distribution, respectively, with their probability density func-
tions (PDFs) given by 1πn|Σ|e
−(x−ν)HΣ−1(x−ν), e
x/λ
λ , and
xα−1ex/β
βαΓ(α) , respectively. Γ (M) and Γ (M,x) are the Gamma
function and the upper incomplete Gamma function [38],
respectively. I{·} is the indicator function. umax {·} denotes
the normalized eigenvector of the largest eigenvalue of a
matrix. 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product. Block diagonal matrix
is denoted by diag (·, · · · , ·).
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND RANDOM TRAINING SCHEME
We consider the downlink secure transmission in a TDD
system which consists of a multiple-antenna BS, a single-
antenna LU, and a single-antenna active Eve. The whole
transmission is divided into two phases, i.e., uplink channel
training phase (UCTP) and downlink data transmission phase
3(DDTP). During the UCTP, the LU transmits a PS to enable
the BS to estimate the channel. During the DDTP, based on
the estimated channel, the BS forms a beam towards the LU to
transmit confidential messages. If Eve attacks the UCTP, e.g.,
PSA or PJA, the BS will obtain a misled channel estimation,
and the downlink beam formed by the BS will not be aligned
with the legitimate channel, which leads to serious information
leakage. In the following, we introduce our RCT scheme to
combat with the PSA and PJA.
A. Random channel training scheme
The procedure of the proposed RCT scheme is shown in
Fig. 1. Different from conventional schemes where each user
is only assigned with one PS, we simultaneously allocate N
(N > 1) orthogonal PSs to the LU 1. Denote the set of PSs
allocated to the LU as Φ , {xn}Nn=1, then we have xHi xj =
τI{i=j}, where τ is the length of the PS. During the UCTP,
the LU randomly chooses a PS from Φ, denoted by x(L), to
perform the uplink channel training. We emphasize that only
the LU knows x(L). Both Eve and the BS know the set Φ 2
but do not know which PS is x(L). For a given instance of
UCTP, the BS receives
YU ,
√
pLhL
(
x(L)
)H
+
√
pEhEa
H + V , (1)
where pL and pE are the powers of the LU and Eve, hL ∈
CM×1 ∼ CN (0,RL) and hE ∈ CM×1 ∼ CN (0,RE) denote
the instantaneous channels of the LU and Eve, a ∈ Cτ×1 is
the attacking signal sequence transmitted by Eve, which will
be detailed later on, and V ∈ CM×τ is the noise with each
element distributed as CN
(
0, σ2T
)
. Due to the fact that RL
and RE change much slower than the instantaneous channels,
we assume that the BS can obtain RL and RE in advance
3.
Note that similar assumptions has also been adopted in [29].
After receiving YU , the BS matches YU with the N different
orthogonal PSs in Φ as illustrated in Fig. 1, and obtains N
channel observations, i.e.,
yn , ϕYUxn
= I{xn=x(L)}hL + ϕ
√
pEhEa
Hxn + zn, (2)
where 1 ≤ n ≤ N , ϕ , 1τ√pL , and zn , ϕV xn ∼
CN
(
0, σ2zIM
)
with σ2z ,
σ2T
τpL
is the equivalent Gaussian
noise. Note that for n 6= m, zn and zm are mutually
independent because xn is orthogonal to xm. Once obtaining
the set of channel observations, i.e., Ψ , {y1,y2, · · · ,yN},
the BS needs to figure out which PS is x(L) in order to
estimate LU’s channel, i.e, hL. Before presenting the details,
we first discuss the attacking schemes of Eve in the following.
1In this paper, we focus on a single-cell system with only one BS. In multi-
cell environments, the PSs will be multiplexed in more than one cell, and the
pilot contamination from other cells makes the problem mathematically much
more complicated. We leave the multi-cell environments for future research.
2Φ is assigned by the BS and shared between the BS and the LU, which is
possible to be successfully intercepted by Eve. As the worst case, we assume
that Eve perfectly knows Φ.
3Note that if Tr (RLRE) = 0, then the attack causes no impact on
estimating LU’s channel, and in this paper, we only consider the cases where
Tr (RLRE)≫ 0, which means that the attacks cause serious impact on the
channel estimation procedure.
Fig. 1: Uplink Training Model.
B. Attacking Schemes of Eve
In the RCT scheme described above, Eve is incapable of
always transmitting the same PS as that transmitted by the
LU due to the randomness. We consider the following two
possible attacking strategies of an active Eve,
• Pilot spoofing attack (PSA): Eve randomly selects several
PSs from Φ and transmits a combination of them during
the UCTP. Conventional PSA where Eve transmits the
same PS as the LU [16] can be viewed as a special case
of the PSA defined here;
• Pilot jamming attack (PJA): Eve transmits randomly
generated Gaussian interference to degrade the accuracy
of the channel estimation.
We discuss the results of these two kinds of attack in the
following.
1) PSA during UCTP: Denote ΦE ⊆ Φ as the set of PSs
selected by Eve during the UCTP. Then, the attacking signal
sequence transmitted by Eve is
aPSA ,
N∑
n=1
I{xn∈ΦE}e
jωn
√
χnxn, (3)
where χn, satisfying
∑N
n=1 I{xn∈ΦE}χn = 1, is the power
factor for transmitting xn, ωn is a random phase shift when
transmitting xn which is unknown by the BS. We will show
that an extra random phase shift, i.e., ejωn , is necessary for Eve
in Section III-C. In this paper, we assume that Eve uniformly
allocate its power among different PSs, i.e., χn =
1
K for
∀xn ∈ ΦE where K , |ΦE |. This is because Eve does not
have any prior knowledge on which PS will be transmitted
by the LU, and hence each PS does not have any priority to
gain more power than the others. According to (3), yn in (2)
becomes
yn = I{xn=x(L)}hL + I{xn∈ΦE}e
jωnβ
(K)
PSAhE + zn, (4)
where β
(K)
PSA ,
√
pE
KpL
. For notational simplicity, define two
non-overlapping subsets of Φ as
Φ¯
(E)
PSA ,
{
xn|xn ∈ ΦE ,xn 6= x(L)
}
=
{
x
(E)
1 ,x
(E)
2 , · · · ,x(E)QE
}
, (5)
Φ¯
(F )
PSA , Φ \
(
Φ¯
(E)
PSA ∪ {x(L)}
)
=
{
x
(F )
1 ,x
(F )
2 , · · · ,x(F )QF
}
, (6)
4where QE , |Φ¯(E)PSA| and QF , |Φ¯(F )PSA|. Based on (5) and
(6), we can rewrite yn in (4) as,
yn =


y(L), xn = x
(L),
y
(E)
i , xn = x
(E)
i ∈ Φ¯(E)PSA,
y
(F )
i , xn = x
(F )
i ∈ Φ¯(F )PSA,
(7)
y(L) , hL + I{x(L)∈ΦE}e
jω(L)β
(K)
PSAhE + z
(L),
y
(E)
i , e
jω
(E)
i β
(K)
PSAhE + z
(E)
i ,
y
(F )
i , z
(F )
i ,
where z(L) ,
∑N
n=1 znI{xn=x(L)}, z
(E)
i ,∑N
n=1 znI{xn=x(E)i }
, z
(F )
i ,
∑N
n=1 znI{xn=x(F )i }
, ω(L) ,∑N
n=1 ωnI{xn=x(L)}, and ω
(E)
i ,
∑N
n=1 ωnI{xn=x(E)i }
.
According to (7), we can divide Ψ = {yn}Nn=1 into three
non-overlapping subsets, i.e., Ψ =
{
y(L)
} ∪ Ψ(E)PSA ∪ Ψ(F )PSA,
where we have Ψ
(E)
PSA ,
{
y
(E)
1 , · · · ,y(E)QE
}
and
Ψ
(F )
PSA ,
{
y
(F )
1 , · · · ,y(F )QF
}
.
We have to point out that the estimation of the legitimate
channel is strongly affected by the realization of x(L) and
ΦE . Due to the fact that x
(L) and ΦE are independently and
randomly selected by the LU and Eve, respectively, we refer
to the occurrence of a hit event when x(L) ∈ ΦE , i.e., the PS
transmitted by the LU is occasionally selected by Eve.
2) PJA during UCTP: During the UCTP, Eve transmits
Gaussian random jamming signals aPJA ∼ CN (0, Iτ ). Then,
yn in (2) becomes
yn = ϕYUxn = I{xn=x(L)}hL + µnβPJAhE + zn, (8)
where we have µn , 1τ a
H
PJAx
(E)
n ∼ CN
(
0, 1τ
)
and βPJA ,√
pE
pL
. Define Φ¯
(E)
PJA as a subset of Φ which is written as
Φ¯
(E)
PJA , Φ \ {x(L)} = {xˇ(E)1 , · · · , xˇ(E)N−1}. (9)
Similar to (7), we rewrite the channel observations in (8) under
PJA as
yn =
{
y(L), xn = x
(L),
y
(E)
i , xn = xˇ
(E)
i ∈ Φ¯(E)PJA,
(10)
y(L) , hL + µ(L)βPJAhE + z(L),
y
(E)
i , µ
(E)
i βPJAhE + z
(E)
i ,
where we have z
(E)
i ,
∑N
n=1 znI{xn=xˇ(E)i }
, µ(L) ,∑N
n=1 µnI{xn=x(L)}, and µ
(E)
i ,
∑N
n=1 µnI{xn=xˇ(E)i }
. Ac-
cording to (10), we divide Ψ under PJA into two non-
overlapping subsets, i.e., Ψ =
{
y(L)
} ∪ Ψ(E)PJA, where we
define Ψ
(E)
PJA ,
{
y
(E)
1 , · · · ,y(E)N−1
}
.
As we can see from (7) and (10), the BS obtains multiple
channel observations, which contains both LU’s and Eve’s
CSI. A critical step for the BS to achieve secrecy transmission
is to figure out which channel observation is y(L) so as to es-
timate the legitimate and illegitimate channels simultaneously.
We will discuss the detailed steps for the BS to identify y(L),
to estimate the channels, and to design the SB vector under the
PSA, in Section III, Section IV, and Section V, respectively.
Secure transmission under the PJA will be discussed in Section
VI in a similar manner.
Remark 1. The proposed scheme can be easily extended
to a multi-user system because we exploit the orthogonality
among different PSs. More specifically, in a system with U
users, the set of PSs Φ can be divided into U non-overlapping
subsets, i.e., Φ(1),Φ(2), · · · ,Φ(U) ⊂ Φ, with Φ(u) allocated to
the uth user, and all the following discussions hold as well.
In following part of this paper, unless specified, we always
assume that there is only one user and all the PSs are allocated
to the user, i.e., N = τ .
III. DETERMINING THE PS OF LU UNDER PSA
In this section, we present the method for the BS to
determine which PS is x(L), or equivalently speaking, which
channel observation is y(L), under the PSA. We also evaluate
the detection performance in terms of the EDR, i.e., the
probability that the BS makes an incorrect decision on y(L).
We have to point out that, as shown in (7), channel ob-
servations in Ψ
(F )
PSA contains neither LU’s nor Eve’s CSI, and
therefore, as a pre-processing step, the BS needs to distinguish
Ψ
(C)
PSA ,
{
y(L)
} ∪Ψ(E)PSA from Ψ(F )PSA. To realize this, the BS
can simply classify yn, (1 ≤ n ≤ N ), into Ψ(C)PSA or Ψ(F )PSA
by comparing their powers with a predesigned threshold ΛC ,
i.e.,‖yn‖2 RΨ
(C)
PSA
Ψ
(F )
PSA
ΛC . We observe that the powers of y
(L)
and y
(E)
n are much larger than y
(F )
n due to the fact that the
noise floor of z
(F )
n is generally small, especially when pL and
τ are large. Therefore, we make a reasonable assumption that
the BS has already obtained the effective channel observation
set Ψ
(C)
PSA correctly. For notational simplicity, we define QC
as the cardinality of Ψ
(C)
PSA, i.e., QC , |Ψ(C)PSA|.
Now, we provide our method for the BS to determine
which channel observation in Ψ
(C)
PSA is y
(L). We note that,
the detection is highly related to the parameter K , which
is, however, chosen by Eve and unknown by the BS. For
simplicity, In the first step we discuss the cases where K
is known by BS, and classify our discussions according to
the value of K and whether or not a hit event occurs. After
that, we extend our method to handle the cases when K is
unknown.
A. K = 1 and Eve successfully hits LU’s PS
In this cases, undoubtedly, we have Ψ
(C)
PSA =
{
y(L)
}
where
y(L) = hL + e
jω(L)β
(1)
PSAhE + z
(L). We note that this is the
case of the conventional PSA and has been discussed in [23]–
[29].
B. K = 1 and Eve fails to hit LU’s PS
In this case, we have QC = 2. Without loss of generality,
denote Ψ
(C)
PSA = {y1,y2}. To determine which one of y1 and
5y2 is y
(L), we formulate a hypothesis test problem, i.e.,
[
y1
y2
]
=


[
y(L)
y(E)
]
=
[
hL + z
(L)
ejω
(E)
β
(1)
PSAhE + z
(E)
]
,H(1,2)0 ,[
y(E)
y(L)
]
=
[
ejω
(E)
β
(1)
PSAhE + z
(E)
hL + z
(L)
]
,H(1,2)1 ,
(11)
where H(1,2)0 represents that y1 = y(L) and H(1,2)1 represents
that y2 = y
(L). To determine y(L), the logarithmic likelihood
ratio (LLR) test is written as
T
(2)
1 , ln p
(
g|H(1,2)0
)
− ln p
(
g|H(1,2)1
)
R
H(1,2)0
H(1,2)1
0, (12)
where g ,
[
yH1 ,y
H
2
]H
, p
(
g|H(1,2)0
)
and p
(
g|H(1,2)1
)
are
the PDFs of g conditioned on H(1,2)0 and H(1,2)1 , respectively.
Note that if H(1,2)0 is true, y1 and y2 are independently
distributed as CN (0,RL,z) and CN
(
0,R
(1)
E,z
)
, respectively,
and if H(1,2)1 is true, y1 and y2 are independently distributed
as CN
(
0,R
(1)
E,z
)
and CN (0,RL,z), respectively, where we
have RL,z , RL + σ2zI and R
(1)
E,z , |β(1)PSA|2RE + σ2zI.
Therefore, (12) can be further simplified as
T
(2)
1 = y
H
1
((
R
(1)
E,z
)−1
−R−1L,z
)
y1
+ yH2
(
R−1L,z −
(
R
(1)
E,z
)−1)
y2R
H(1,2)0
H(1,2)1
0. (13)
According to (13), the EDR in this case is given by
P(1,2)EDR , P
{
T
(2)
1 < 0|H(1,2)0
}
= P
{
T
(2)
1 > 0|H(1,2)1
}
. (14)
The calculation of P(1,2)EDR is provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. P(1,2)EDR can be calculated as
P(1,2)EDR = P
{
wHΞw < 0
}
, (15)
where w is a Gaussian random vector distributed as
CN (0, I2M ), and
Ξ ,
[
Ξ1 − IM , 0M×M
0M×M , Ξ2 − IM
]
, (16)
with Ξ1 , R
1
2
L,z
(
R
(1)
E,z
)−1
R
1
2
L,z and Ξ2 ,(
R
(1)
E,z
) 1
2
R−1L,z
(
R
(1)
E,z
) 1
2
.
Proof: The detailed derivation of (16) is provided in (17)
at the top of the next page, where we have w1 , R
− 12
L,zy1,
w2 ,
(
R
(1)
E,z
)− 12
y2, w ,
[
wH1 ,w
H
2
]H
, and Ξ1, Ξ2 and
Ξ are defined in (16). Note that conditioned on H(1,2)0 ,
y1 and y2 are independently distributed as CN (0,RL,z)
and CN
(
0,R
(1)
E,z
)
, respectively. Therefore, we have w ∼
CN (0, I2M ). In fact, (15) is the CDF of an indefinite quadratic
form of a Gaussian random vector, the calculation of which
is provided in Appendix D.
C. K = 2 and Eve successfully hits LU’s PS
In this case, we also have QC = 2. Without loss of
generality, denoting Ψ
(C)
PSA = {y1,y2}, we have
[
y1
y2
]
=


[
y(L)
y(E)
]
=
[
hL + e
jω(L)β
(2)
PSAhE + z
(L)
ejω
(E)
β
(2)
PSAhE + z
(E)
]
,H(2,2)0 ,
[
y(E)
y(L)
]
=
[
ejω
(E)
β
(2)
PSAhE + z
(E)
hL + e
jω(L)β
(2)
PSAhE + z
(L)
]
,H(2,2)1 ,
(18)
where H(2,2)0 represents that y1 = y(L), and H(2,2)1 represents
the opposite. Before determining which one of H(2,2)1 and
H(2,2)2 is true, we have the following remark.
Remark 2. In fact, (18) provides us an explicit explanation
on why random phase shifts ejωn are necessary when Eve
transmits multiple PSs. If the random phase shifts are absent,
then once the BS knows which channel observation is y(L),
it can cancel the impact of hE on y
(L) by subtracting y(E)
from y(L) and obtain an uncontaminated version of channel
observation of hL, i.e., yˇ
(L) , y(L) − y(E) = hL + z(L) −
z(E). Estimating hL from yˇ
(L) provides more accurate result
than from y(L), which is generally not expected by the Eve.
Conditioned on H(2,2)0 , we have g ∼ CN (0,Rg,0 (ω)), and
conditioned on H(2,2)1 , we have g ∼ CN (0,Rg,1 (ω)), where
ω , ω(L) − ω(E), and
Rg,0 (ω) ,
[
R
(2)
L,E,z e
jωR
(2)
E
e−jωR(2)E R
(2)
E,z
]
, (19a)
Rg,1 (ω) ,
[
R
(2)
E,z e
−jωR(2)E
ejωR
(2)
E R
(2)
L,E,z
]
, (19b)
with R
(2)
E , |β(2)PSA|2RE and R(2)L,E,z , RL,z +R(2)E . Now,
we provide our method to distinguish y(L) from y(E). Since
the value of ω(L) and ω(E) are unknowns, using LLR test to
determine y(L) is not applicable. In the following, we provide
two methods to determine y(L).
1) Power comparison based method: We observe that hL
and hE are mutually independent random vectors, and thus,
the power of y(L) is expected to be larger than y(E). Based
on this observation, we propose to simply compare the powers
of y1 and y2, i.e.,
T˜
(2)
2 , ‖y1‖2 − ‖y2‖2R
H(2,2)0
H(2,2)1
0. (20)
According to (20), the EDR is given by
P˜(2,2)EDR , P
{
T˜
(2)
2 > 0|H(2,2)1
}
= P
{
T˜
(2)
2 < 0|H(2,2)0
}
= P
{∥∥∥hL + ejω(L)β(2)PSAhE + z(L)∥∥∥2
−
∥∥∥ejω(E)β(2)PSAhE + z(E)∥∥∥2 < 0
}
. (21)
We note that the calculation of (21) is difficult for two
reasons: (1) the joint PDF of (y1,y2) is unknown due to
the unknown parameters ω(L) and ω(E), and (2) though
6P(1,2)EDR = P
{
yH1
((
R
(1)
E,z
)−1
−R−1L,z
)
y1 + y
H
2
(
R−1L,z −
(
R
(1)
E,z
)−1)
y2 < 0|H(1,2)0
}
= P
{
yH1 R
− 12
L,z (Ξ1 − IM )R
− 12
L,zy1 + y
H
2
(
R
(1)
E,z
)− 12
(Ξ2 − IM )
(
R
(1)
E,z
)− 12
y2 < 0|H(1,2)0
}
= P {wH1 (Ξ1 − IM )w1 +w2 (Ξ2 − IM )wH2 < 0} = P {wHΞw < 0} . (17)
the marginal distribution of y1 and y2 are known, they are
correlated with each other. Fortunately, we successfully obtain
the following theorem to provide a tractable expression for
numerical evaluation of (21).
Theorem 2. The EDR in (21) is irrelevant to ω(L) and ω(E),
and can be written as
P˜(2,2)EDR = P
{
αHWα < 0
}
(22)
where α ∼ CN (0, I2M ) and W is an indefinite Hermitian
matrix defined in Appendix A.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. Besides, we provide
a mathematical expression for numerical evaluation of (22) in
Appendix D.
2) Generalized logarithmic likelihood ratio (GLLR) based
method: GLLR is an extension of regular LLR, which is
usually used to handle hypothesis test problems with unknown
parameters [37]. The GLLR test for (18) is given by
T
(2)
2 , ln
(
max
ω(L),ω(E)
p
(
g|H(2,2)0
))
− ln
(
max
ω(L),ω(E)
p
(
g|H(2,2)1
))
R
H(2,2)0
H(2,2)1
0, (23)
where for i ∈ {0, 1}, p
(
g|H(2,2)i
)
is the PDF of g conditioned
onH(2,2)i . Based on (19), T (2)2 in (23) can be further simplified
as
T
(2)
2 =
(
min
ω
yH1 By1 + y
H
2 Ay2 + 2Re
{
e−jωyH1 C
Hy2
})
−
(
min
ω
yH1 Ay1 + y
H
2 By2 + 2Re
{
ejωyH1 Cy2
})
= yH1 (B −A)y1 + yH2 (A−B)y2
+ 2
∣∣yH1 Cy2∣∣− 2 ∣∣yH1 CHy2∣∣ , (24)
where A, B, and C are three M -dimensional square matrices
satisfying [
A C
CH B
]
=
[
R
(2)
L,E,z R
(2)
E
R
(2)
E R
(2)
E,z
]−1
. (25)
According to (23), the EDR is given by
P(2,2)EDR , P
{
T
(2)
2 < 0|H(2,2)0
}
= P
{
T
(2)
2 > 0|H(2,2)1
}
.
In the simulation part, we will show that P(2,2)EDR is generally
small, which means that the BS can successfully recog-
nize y(L) with high probability. Note that the calculation
of T
(2)
2 requires an inverse operation with respect to a
2M−dimensionalmatrix, therefore, the GLLR based method
is computationally more complex than the power comparison
0
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Fig. 2: Basic principle of the proposed distance-based method.
based method.
D. K = 2 but Eve fails to hit LU’s PS, or K > 2
In this case, we have the following two situations:
• K > 2 and Eve hits LU’s PS, and we have y(L) =
hL + e
jω(L)β
(K)
PSAhE + z
(L) ∈ Ψ(C)PSA.
• K ≥ 2 but Eve fails to hit LU’s PS, and we have y(L) =
hL + z
(L) ∈ Ψ(C)PSA.
Denote the channel observations in Ψ
(C)
PSA as {y1, · · · ,yQC}.
For both cases listed above, the BS needs to figure out which
channel observation is y(L). We propose an unified method to
handle both of the two cases, regardless the value of K . Note
that we have Ψ
(C)
PSA = {y(L)} ∪Ψ(E)PSA. From (7), we observe
that for a given realization of hE , the channel observations in
Ψ
(E)
PSA, after some phase shifts, are clustered around β
(K)
PSAhE
in a M–dimensional complex-valued space with relatively
small biases due to the noise terms, i.e., z
(E)
1 , z
(E)
2 , · · · , z(E)QE .
However, y(L) is generally apart from β
(K)
PSAhE due to the
existence of hL. This observation inspires us a novel distance-
based method to determine y(L), the basic principle of which
is shown in Fig 2.
1) The distance-based method: For ∀n ∈ {0, 1, · · · , QC},
define the distances between the channel observations as
dn , I{1≤n≤QC−1}
(
min
φ
∥∥yn − ejφyn+1∥∥2
)
+ I{n=0 or QC}
(
min
φ
∥∥y1 − ejφyQC∥∥2
)
. (26)
If dn > ǫ and dn−1 > ǫ, then we conclude that yn = y(L), and
if dn ≤ ǫ and dn−1 ≤ ǫ, then we conclude that yn ∈ Ψ(E)PSA,
7where ǫ is a pre-designed threshold. Note that it is possible
that dn > ǫ (dn < ǫ) while both dn−1 and dn+1 are smaller
(larger) than ǫ, which leads to a dilemma. Therefore, a proper
threshold ǫ should be designed to keep the probabilities of
these events low.
2) Design the threshold ǫ: If {yn,yn+1} ⊂ Ψ(E)PSA, we
expect the probability that dn exceeds ǫ to be as small as
possible. Therefore, we choose the value of ǫ such that
PF (ǫ) , P
{
dn > ǫ|{yn,yn+1} ⊂ Ψ(E)PSA
}
≤ η, (27)
where η (0 < η < 1) is a pre-designed value. In fact, η is
analogous to the false alarm rate in a hypothesis test problem,
and in general, we should set a small value of η to ensure a
low EDR. Note that P {dn < ǫ|yn = y(L) or yn+1 = y(L)}
increases with ǫ, and thus, we set PF (ǫ) = η to obtain the
smallest decision threshold ǫ that satisfies (27).
The direct calculation of ǫ via PF (ǫ) is difficult because
there is no closed-form expression for PF (ǫ). To deal with
this problem, in the following theorem, we provide an upper
bound on dn when {yn,yn+1} ⊂ Ψ(E)PSA to obtain a closed-
form approximation of PF (ǫ).
Theorem 3. A closed-form upper bound on PF (ǫ) can be
written as
PF (ǫ) ≤ P˜F (ǫ) , Γ
(
M, ǫ/(2σ2z)
)
/Γ (M) . (28)
Proof: Conditioned on {yn,yn+1} ⊂ Ψ(E)PSA, we have
dn = min
φ
∥∥∥ejωnβ(K)PSAhE + zn
− ejφ
(
ejωn+1β
(K)
PSAhE + zn+1
)∥∥∥2
≤ d˜n ,
∥∥∥zn − ej(ωn−ωn+1)zn+1∥∥∥2 . (29)
In (29),
(
zn − ej(ωn−ωn+1)zn+1
) ∼ CN (0, 2σ2zI), and thus
d˜n ∼ G
(
M, 2σ2z
)
. According to (29), the CCDF of d˜n, i.e.,
P˜F (ǫ) in (28), is an upper bound on PF (ǫ).
Using d˜n in (29) to approximate dn leads to an approxima-
tion of ǫ, i.e., ǫ˜ , 2σ2zΓ−1 (M, ηΓ (M)), where Γ−1 (M,x) is
the inverse function of Γ (M,x). We show the high accuracy
of using d˜n to approximate dn in Fig. 4(a) in Section VII.
3) EDR analysis: Without loss of generality, assume y1 =
y(L), then the BS may make a mistake on determining y(L) if
one of the following events happens: (1) d1 ≤ ǫ, denoted by
E1, (2) d0 ≤ ǫ, denoted by E2, and (3) ∃k ∈ {2, 3, · · · , QC−1}
satisfying dk > ǫ, denoted by E3. Accordingly, the EDR can
be written as PEDR , P
{⋃3
i=1 Ei
}
.
In general, a tractable expression for PEDR is hard to obtain
due to the fact that: (1) the PDFs of dn for n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , QC}
are complicated, and (2) {d0, d1, · · · , dQC} are correlated
with each other. Here we consider an upper approximation
of PEDR, which is given by
PEDR = P
{∪3i=1Ei} ≤ P {E1}+ P {E2}+ P {E3}
≈ PEDR , 2P {E1}+ η, (30)
where we approximate P {E3} as η based on the observation
that we have P{dn > ǫ} ≤ η for ∀n ∈ {2, 3, · · · , QC − 1},
and when η is small, the probability of having multiple
elements in {d2, d3, · · · , dQC−1} larger than ǫ is negligible.
Now, to calculate PEDR is equivalent to calculate
P {d1 ≤ ǫ}. However, since there is no tractable expression
for the PDF of d1, it is still very difficult if not impossible. To
deal with this problem, we provide a tractable approximate of
d1 as follows:
• if y1 is contaminated by hE , we denote d1 in this case
as d
(C)
1 , and then we have
d
(C)
1 , min
φ
∥∥∥hL + ejω1β(K)PSAhE + z1
− ejφ
(
ejω2β
(K)
PSAhE + z2
) ∥∥∥2
≈ d˜(C)1 , min
φ
∥∥∥hL + z1 − z˜2
+
(
ejω1 − ejφejω2)β(K)PSAhE∥∥∥2, (31)
• if y1 is not contaminated by hE , we denote d1 in this
case as d
(N)
1 , and then we have
d
(N)
1 , min
φ
∥∥∥hL + z1 − ejφ (ejω2β(K)PSAhE + z2)∥∥∥2
≈ d˜(N)1 , min
φ
∥∥∥hL + z1 − z˜2 − ejφejω2β(K)PSAhE∥∥∥2 ,
(32)
where the approximations in (31) and (32) is obtained by re-
placing ejφz2 with z˜2 ∼ CN
(
0, σ2zIM
)
which is independent
of φ. Both of d˜
(C)
1 and d˜
(N)
1 are further lower bounded by
d˜
(i)
1 ≥ minx ‖hL + z − xhE‖
2
= ‖hL + z‖2 −
∣∣hHE (hL + z)∣∣2
‖hE‖2
(a)≈ dˆ1 , (hL + z)H Q (hL + z) , i ∈ {C,N}, (33)
where z , z1− z˜2, Q , I− RETr(RE) , and step (a) is obtained
by using
hEh
H
E
‖hE‖2 →
RE
Tr(RE)
when M is large.
According to (33), we can approximate P {E1} by
P
{
dˆ1 ≤ ǫ
}
, and the calculation of P
{
dˆ1 ≤ ǫ
}
is provided
in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. P
{
dˆ1 ≤ ǫ
}
can be calculated as
P
{
dˆ1 ≤ ǫ
}
= P {αHQ¯α ≤ ǫ} , (34)
where α ∼ CN (0, IM ), and Q¯ ,(
RL + 2σ
2
zIM
) 1
2 Q
(
RL + 2σ
2
zIM
) 1
2 .
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, and
thus is omitted.
We plot the CCDF of d
(C)
1 ,d
(N)
1 , and dˆ1 in Fig. 4(a) to
show that d
(N)
1 is a satisfying lower approximation of both
d
(C)
1 and d
(N)
1 . And we also compare PEDR obtained from
simulation with its analytical upper approximation PEDR in
(30) in Section VII.
8E. If K is unknown by the BS
We have discussed the cases when K is known by the BS
in the previous subsections. In practice, K is chosen by Eve
and the BS generally does not have any prior information on
K . However, even though the BS does not know the value
of K , we will show that in order to identify y(L), the BS
only needs to carry out some additional operations to decide
whether a hit event happens. And then, all the discussions
in the previous subsections hold as well. In the following,
the detailed discussions on these additional operations are
provided. For simplicity and clarity, we classify the discussions
according to the value of QC .
1) QC = 1: In this case, Ψ
(C)
PSA =
{
y(L)
}
, and the BS
needs to distinguish between:
• H(0,1): K = 0, i.e., Eve keeps silent,
• H(1,1): K = 1 and Eve successfully hits LU’s PS.
Note that to distinguish between H(0,1) and H(1,1) is equiv-
alent to detect the existence of PSA under the conventional
channel training scheme wherein only one PS is assigned to the
LU as discussed in [22]–[26]. And this can be easily realized
by checking the LLR, i.e.,
ln p
{
y(L)|H(0,1)
}
− ln p
{
y(L)|H(1,1)
}
R
H(0,1)
H(1,1)0, (35)
where y(L) ∼ CN (0,RL,z) conditioned on H0, and y(L) ∼
CN
(
0,R
(1)
L,E,z
)
conditioned on H1.
2) QC = 2: The following two situations will result in
QC = 2, i.e.,
• H(1,2): K = 1, but Eve fails to hit LU’s PS,
• H(2,2): K = 2, and Eve successfully hits LU’s PS.
To distinguish between H(1,2) and H(2,2), we first determine
the subcases of H(1,2), i.e., H(1,2)0 and H(1,2)1 defined in
Section III-B, by using the method provided in Section III-B.
Assume the decision result between H(1,2)0 and H(1,2)1 is
denoted by H(1,2)j1 where j1 = argmaxi=0,1 p
(
g|H(1,2)i
)
.
Then, we determine the subcases of H(2,2), i.e., H(2,2)0 and
H(2,2)1 defined in Section III-C, by using the method pro-
vided in Section III-C (both the power comparison based
method and the GLLR based method are applicable). If
the GLLR based method is used, then we denote the de-
cision result between H(2,2)0 and H(2,2)1 as H(2,2)j2 , where
j2 = argmaxi=0,1
(
maxω(L),ω(E) p
(
g|H(2,2)i
))
. After ob-
taining H(1,2)j1 and H
(2,2)
j2
, we now resort to GLLR test
to determine which one of H(1,2) and H(2,2) is true, i.e.,
ln
(
maxω(L),ω(E) p
(
g|H(2,2)j2
))
− ln p
(
g|H(1,2)j1
)
RH
(2,2)
H(1,2) 0.
3) QC > 2: In this cases, we can first recognize which
channel observation in Ψ
(C)
PSA is y
(L) by using the distance-
based method proposed in Section III-D. After obtaining y(L),
we only need to determine whether Eve hits LU’s PS, which
can be simply realized by checking the LLR which is similar
to that in (35).
Combining all these steps in the discussions above, we can
determine which PS is x(L) (which channel observation is
y(L)), even when K is unknown by the BS.
IV. CHANNEL ESTIMATION UNDER PSA
After determining which PS is x(L), now the BS can
estimate both of the legitimate and illegitimate channels.
A. Estimation of the legitimate channel
Assume minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimator
is used at the BS, then the estimation of LU’s channel and
corresponding the mean square error (MSE) matrices are given
by
hˆL = I{x(L)∈ΦE}RL
(
R
(K)
L,E,z
)−1
y(L)
+ I{x(L) /∈ΦE}RL (RL,z)
−1
y(L), (36)
R˜L = E
{(
hL − hˆL
)(
hL − hˆL
)H}
= I{x(L)∈ΦE}
(
RL −RL
(
R
(K)
L,E,z
)−1
RL
)
+ I{x(L) /∈ΦE}
(
RL −RL (RL,z)−1RL
)
. (37)
B. Estimation of illegitimate channel
To estimate the channel of Eve, we consider the following
two situations:
1) QC = 1 and PSA is detected: In this case, the only one
channel observation in ΨC is y
(L) = hL + e
jω(L)β
(1)
PSAhE +
z(L), and therefore, the estimation of Eve’s channel4 and the
corresponding MSE matrix are given by
hˆE = β
(1)
PSARE
(
R
(1)
L,E,z
)−1
y(L), (38)
R˜E = E
{(
ejω
(L)
hE − hˆE
)(
ejω
(L)
hE − hˆE
)H}
= RE −
∣∣∣β(1)PSA∣∣∣2RE (R(1)L,E,z)−1RE . (39)
2) QC > 1: In this case, we can estimate hE from
the channel observations in Ψ
(E)
PSA. Denote the channel ob-
servations in Ψ
(E)
PSA as y
(E)
i = β
(K)
PSAh
(i)
E + z
(E)
i , for i =
1, 2, · · · , QE , where we have h(i)E , ejω
(E)
i hE . To estimate the
illegitimate channel, we first combine y
(E)
1 ,y
(E)
2 , · · · ,y(E)QE as
yE ,
1
QE
QE∑
i=1
κiy
(E)
i =
1
QE
QE∑
i=1
κiβ
(K)
PSAh
(i)
E + z˜E , (40)
where κi , 〈y(E)1 ,y(E)i 〉
/|〈y(E)1 ,y(E)i 〉|, for i =
1, 2, · · · , QE , are the combination coefficients, and z˜E ,
1
QE
∑QE
i=1 κiz
(E)
i is the noise term. Note that the exact
distribution of z˜E , or even its covariance matrix, is very
hard to obtain because the combination coefficients, i.e.,
{κi}QEi=1, are determined by {y(E)i }QEi=1 in a extremely com-
plicated form. However, we observe that the noise floor of
z
(E)
i decreases with the increase of τ and pL, and when
4We have to point out here that the estimated illegitimate channel, i.e.,
hˆE , is, in fact, not an estimation of hE but an estimation of the entirety
of the product of ejω
(L)
and hE , i.e., e
jω(L)
hE . Due to the fact that hE
is a circular symmetrical complex random vector, ejω
(L)
hE has the same
distribution as hE , even though ω
(L) is unknown.
9τ and pL is sufficiently large, it reasonable to approximate
κi as κi ≈ κ˜i , ej
(
ω
(E)
1 −ω(E)i
)
. Based on κ˜i, we have
E
{
z
(E)
i
(
z
(E)
i
)H}
≈ σ2zQE IM . Inserting κi ≈ κ˜i into (40),
we obtain yE ≈ β(K)PSAh(1)E + z˜E . Using the linear MMSE
estimator to estimate the illegitimate channel, we have
hˆE = β
(K)
PSARE
(
R
(K)
E +
σ2z
QE
IM
)−1
yE , (41)
R˜E = RE −
∣∣∣β(K)PSA∣∣∣2RE
(
R
(K)
E +
σ2z
QE
IM
)−1
RE . (42)
V. SECURE TRANSMISSION UNDER PSA
After UCTP, based on the channel estimations, SB vector
is designed to transmit the confidential messages. Denote the
signals received by the LU and Eve during DDTP as yL and
yE , respectively, then yq for q ∈ {L,E} can be written as
yq =
√
pB
(
hˆq + h˜q
)H
vx+ nq, (43)
where hˆq for q ∈ {L,E} are the estimations of the legitimate
and illegitimate channels, respectively, h˜q , hq − hˆq for
q ∈ {L,E} are the corresponding estimation errors, nq ∼
CN
(
0, σ2q
)
for q ∈ {L,E} are the additive white Gaussian
noises, v satisfying ‖v‖ = 1 is the SB vector designed by
the BS, x ∼ CN (0, 1) is the confidential signal, and pB is
the power budget of the BS. Note that if positive secrecy rate
exists, maximum power is optimal [33].
We make an reasonable assumption here that the LU
and Eve can know their equivalent channel coefficients, i.e.,(
hˆL + h˜L
)H
v and
(
hˆE + h˜E
)H
v, when they decode the
information-bearing symbols. This assumption can be realized
in the following two ways,
• after obtaining the beamforming vector v, the BS per-
forms a downlink training procedure to let the LU esti-
mate its equivalent channel coefficient.
• note that the equivalent channel is only a complex num-
ber, and the LU may direct learn it through the received
signal symbols during the whole DDTP.
Based on this assumption, the SNR of the LU and Eve can
be written, respectively, as SNRL =
pB|vH(hˆL+h˜L)|2
σ2L
and
SNRE =
pB |vH(hˆE+h˜E)|2
σ2E
. Then the secrecy rate is given
by
RS = ln
(
1 + SNRL
1 + SNRE
)
= ln
(
vHHLv
vHHEv
)
, (44)
whereHq , I+ pBσ2q
(
hˆq + h˜q
)(
hˆq + h˜q
)H
for q ∈ {L,E}.
Note that h˜L and h˜E are the channel estimation errors which
are unknown by the BS when designing v, therefore, the BS is
not able to maximize the instantaneous secrecy rate. To secure
the data transmission, the BS can alternatively maximize the
average secrecy rate over the unknown channel estimation
errors h˜L and h˜E , i.e.,
max
v,‖v‖2=1
Eh˜B ,h˜E
{RS} . (45)
In general, solving (45) is complicated because the expectation
operation in (45) leads to an intractable expression of the
objective. To handle it, the following lemma provides us a
tractable approximation of the objective in (45).
Lemma 1. For two random variables X and Y sat-
isfying X,Y ≥ 0, ln
(
1+EX{X}
1+EY {Y }
)
can approximate
EX,Y
{
ln
(
1+X
1+Y
)}
in the sense that they have common upper
and lower bounds.
Proof: This lemma is inspired by [31, Lemma 1], and the
proof is given in Appendix B.
Using Lemma 1, problem (45) is approximated by
max
v,‖v‖2=1
vHH¯Lv
vHH¯Ev
, (46)
where we have H¯q , I+ pBσ2E
(
hˆqhˆ
H
q + R˜q
)
for q ∈ {L,E}.
Note that similar approximations are also used in [11], [32]
for mathematical tractability. Problem (46) is to maximize a
generalized Rayleigh quotient, whose optimal solution is given
by vopt = umax
{(
H¯E
)−1 (
H¯L
)}
. The calculation of vopt
may be computationally complex when M gets large. In fact,
(46) can be lower bounded by
max
v˜,‖v˜‖2=1
pB
σ2L
v˜H hˆLhˆ
H
L v˜
v˜HH¯E v˜
. (47)
and the optimal beamforming vector for (47) is v˜opt =
ρ (HE)
−1
hˆL. where ρ is a scaling factor chosen to satisfy
v˜Hoptv˜opt = 1.
Remark 3. The matrix inverse operation in vopt and v˜opt
are in the form of
(
B + µµH
)−1
, whereB = I+ pB
σ2E
R˜E and
µ =
√
pB
σ2E
hˆE , which can be implemented by using the Matrix
Inverse Lemma, i.e.,
(
B + µµH
)−1
= B−1 − B−1µµHB−11+µHB−1µ .
Note that R˜E is the MSE matrix which is usually known
previously, therefore, B−1 can be precalculated to reduce the
real time computational complexity.
VI. SECURE TRANSMISSION UNDER PJA
In this section, we discuss the method to deal with the PJA
during UCTP. We follow the same steps as what we did to
deal with PSA in previous sections, i.e., we first determine
which PS is transmitted by the LU, and then we estimate the
legitimate and illegitimate channels, and finally we design the
secure beamforming vector.
A. Determine which PS is transmitted by the LU
We have to point out that to identify y(L) from Ψ under PJA
is more complicated than that under PSA. This is because un-
der PSA, the amplitude of hE projected on each PS, i.e., β
(K)
PSA,
is fixed, and only the phase shifts, i.e., {ω(E)1 , · · · , ω(E)K }, are
unknown. However, under PJA, both the amplitudes and the
phase shifts are unknown because {µ1, · · · , µN} are complex-
valued random variables. To make a decision, we further
develop the distance-based method proposed in Section III-D
to make it applicable to combat with the PJA.
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For n = 1, 2, · · · , N , we redefine the distance between two
channel observations as

d
(+)
PJA,n , I{1≤n<N}
(
min
a
‖yn − ayn+1‖2
)
+ I{n=N}
(
min
a
‖yN − ay1‖2
)
,
d
(−)
PJA,n , I{1<n≤N}
(
min
a
‖yn − ayn−1‖2
)
+ I{n=1}
(
min
a
‖y1 − ayN‖2
)
.
(48)
Note that (48) is different from (26) in the sense that the
parameter a is a general complex-valued number but not in the
form of ejϕ. Besides, in general, we have d
(−)
PJA,n+1 6= d(+)PJA,n.
The decision method is modified as: if d
(+)
PJA,n ≥ ǫ and
d
(−)
PJA,n+1 ≥ ǫ, then we decide that yn = y(L).
In general, a proper threshold ǫ should be designed to keep
a low EDR. Therefore, we choose ǫ such that it satisfies
P
{
d
(+)
PJA,n > ǫ|{yn,yn+1} ⊂ Ψ(E)PJA
}
(∗)
= P
{
d
(−)
PJA,n+1 > ǫ|{yn,yn+1} ⊂ Ψ(E)PJA
}
≤ η, (49)
where step (∗) is because d(+)PJA,n has the same distribution as
d
(−)
PJA,n+1, if {yn,yn+1} ⊂ Ψ(E)PJA. Note that the exact distribu-
tion of d
(+)
PJA,n is hard to obtain, and we provide a closed-form
upper bound on P
{
d
(+)
PJA,n > ǫ|{yn,yn+1} ⊂ Ψ(E)PJA
}
as an
approximation in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. If {yn,yn+1} ⊂ Ψ(E)PJA, then P
{
d
(+)
PJA,n > ǫ
}
is upper bounded by
P(F)PJA (ǫ) ,
σ2zM
ǫ
− e−
ǫ
σ2z
M−1∑
m=0
m∑
k=0
1
k!
(
ǫ
σ2z
)k−1
. (50)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
It can be easily verified that P(F)PJA (ǫ) decreases with ǫ.
Therefore, we can use the bisection method to search ǫ˜ such
that P(F)PJA (ǫ˜) = η, and use ǫ˜ as the decision threshold.
Under PJA, the distributions of d
(+)
PJA,n and d
(−)
PJA,n are
extremely complicated if yn = y
(L), and therefore the EDR
analysis is left for future work. Here, we have to emphasize
that the proposed distance-based method only relies on the
difference between hL and hE , but not the difference between
RL and RE . Therefore, even if RL = RE , the proposed
method still works.
B. Channel Estimation
Without loss of generality, in this subsection, we as-
sume y1 = y
(L). We can use linear MMSE esti-
mator to estimate the legitimate channel, i.e., hˆL =
RL
(
RL +
1
τ |βPJA|
2
RE + σ
2
zI
)−1
y1, and thus, the cor-
responding MSE matrix becomes R˜PJA,L = RL −
RL
(
RL +
1
τ |βPJA|2RE + σ2zI
)−1
RL. Note that under
PJA, the linear MMSE estimator is not the optimal estimator
in the MMSE sense due to the fact that u1hE is not a Gaussian
random vector. As for the estimation of hE , we have to
point out that though y2,y3, · · · ,yN contain hE , it is still
hard to estimate hE due to the unknown parameters µk for
k = 2, 3, · · · , N . Define YE , [y2,y3, · · · ,yN ], we propose
to only estimate the directional information of hE in a M–
dimensional complex-valued vector space as,
hˇE = argmax‖x‖2=1 x
HYEY
H
E x, (51)
and obviously, we get hˇE = umax
(
YEY
H
E
)
. The principle
behind the estimator in (51) can be summarized as follows.
Each column of the matrix YE is in the form of µhE+z. The
value of z is generally small, and therefore, the characteristic
space of YEY
H
E should be dominated by hE .
C. Secure Transmission
Note that only the directional information of the illegitimate
channel, i.e, hˇE , is obtained, so we are not able to evaluate
the secrecy rate. As an alternative, we propose to maximize
the SNR of the LU, using the zero-forcing beamforming, i.e.,
we only transmit signal in the null-space of hˇE . Assume
that the equivalent channel coefficient can be obtained by the
LU as in Section V, then the SNR at the LU is SNRL =
pB|vH(hˆL+h˜L)|2
σ2L
. When designing v, h˜L is not known by
the BS, and hence we use the average SNR as the objective
function. We have
max
v∈CM×1
Eh˜L
{SNRL} = pB
σ2L
vHH¯PJAv,
s.t. vHv = 1, hˇHE v = 0.
(52)
where H¯PJA , hˆLhˆHL + R˜PJA,L. In fact, (52) is equivalent
to maximizing v˜HPHH¯PJAP v˜ with respect to v˜, where
v˜ ∈ C(M−1)×1 satisfies ‖v˜‖ = 1, and P ∈ CM×(M−1) is a
sub-unitary matrix satisfying PH hˇE = 0 and P
HP = IM−1.
Obviously, we have v˜opt = umax
{
PHH¯PJAP
}
, and the
optimal solution for (52) is given by vopt = P v˜opt.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the secrecy performance of
the proposed uplink channel training and downlink data
transmission framework. The BS is equipped with an uni-
form linear array (ULA) with antenna spacing half of
the wavelength. The following spatially correlated chan-
nel model is used in simulations unless specified: we set
Rq =
∫ π
2
−π2
Pq (θ) (a (θ))
H
a (θ) dθ for q ∈ {L,E}, where
a (θ) ,
[
1, e−jπ sin(θ), · · · , e−jπ(M−1) sin(θ)] is the steering
vector of ULA, Pq (θ) , ξqI{θ∈Θq} for q ∈ {L,E} are the
power azimuth spectrum of the LU and Eve, respectively,
in which ξq is a constant satisfying
∫ π
2
−π2
Pq (θ) dθ = 1,
Θq ,
⋃Tq
i=1
[
θ¯q,i − θ(D)q,i /2, θ¯q,i + θ(D)q,i /2
]
, TL (TE) are the
numbers of multi-paths from the BS to the LU (Eve), and for
q ∈ {L,E}, θ¯q,i and θ(D)q,i are the center and the angle spread
of the ith path. Note that when Tq = 1, this channel model
degrades to that in [34], [35].
A. EDR evaluation
In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, we evaluate the EDRs under the PSA
through simulation. In Fig. 3, we simulate the case when there
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(a) P
(1,2)
EDR versus the transmit power of Eve.
(b) P˜
(2,2)
EDR and P
(2,2)
EDR versus the transmit power of Eve.
Fig. 3: EDRs under the PSA when there are only two effective
channel observations.
are only two effective channel observations, and in Fig. 4,
we simulate the case when there are more than two effective
channel observations. The reason why we simulate the two
cases separately is that we use totally different methods to
deal with these two cases as shown in Section III.
In Fig. 3, the number of antennas at the BS, the length
of the PS, and the transmit power of the LU are set to
M = 64, τ = 5, and pL = 10 dBm , respectively. We
adopt the spatially correlated channel model introduced at
the beginning of this section by setting TL = TE = 1,
θ¯L,1 = 0
◦, and θ(D)L,1 = θ
(D)
E,1 = 30
◦. In Fig. 3(a), we evaluate
the EDRs under the condition that Eve only transmits one
PS (K = 1) but fails to hit the PS transmitted by the LU.
As shown in Fig. 3(a), for fixed transmit power of Eve,
when the direction of Eve gets closer to that of the LU, the
EDR will significantly increase. This is because in this case,
the statistical properties, e.g., the covariance matrix, of the
legitimate and the illegitimate channels tend to be consistent,
which makes it harder to differentiate the legitimate channel
from the illegitimate channel. Besides, we show that the value
of P(1,2)EDR becomes large when pE approaches to pL and tends
to be small when pE is quite different from pE . This is because
if pE is much smaller or much larger than pL, the amplitude
of y(E) in (11) will be markedly distinct from that of y(L),
which makes y(L) more distinguishable and thus results in the
decreasing EDRs. In Fig. 3(b), we evaluate the EDR under the
(a) CCDFs of d
(C)
1 ,d
(N)
1 , dˆ1, dn, and dˆn.
(b) EDR versus K under different transmit power of Eve.
Fig. 4: EDRs under the PSA when there are more than two
effective channel observations.
condition that Eve transmits two PS (K = 2) and successfully
hits the PS transmitted by the LU. The performance of both
the power comparison based method and the GLLR based
method are checked. As we can see from Fig. 3(b), the GLLR
based method generally outperforms the power comparison
based method. This is due to the fact that in the power
comparison based method, we only utilize partial information
of the channel observations, i.e., the power, to determine y(L),
while in the GLLR based method, high order statistics of
y(L) and y(E), i.e., the covariance matrices, are utilized to
determine y(L) and thus enjoys a lower EDR. Besides, we
also observe that P(2,2)EDR tends to increase with pE . This is
because when pE becomes large, the statistics of y
(L) will
be dominated by that of the term ejω
(E)
β
(2)
PSAhE in (18), and
consequently, the impact of hL on y
(L) becomes relatively
smaller, which means that the statistical differences between
y(L) and y(E) also gets relatively smaller. And therefore, it is
harder to distinguish y(L) from y(E) when pE is large.
In Fig. 4, we evaluate the EDRs when there are more than
two effective channel observations. In the simulation, we set
M = 32, and other parameters are set to be the same as those
in Fig. 3, unless specified. Note that the proposed distance
based method does not utilize the statistical properties of
the legitimate and illegitimate channels to identify y(L), and
therefore, we set θ¯E,1 = θ¯L,1 = 0
◦ for simplicity. In Fig.
4(a), we keep β
(K)
PSA = 0.5 regardless of the value of K , and
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(a) CCDF of d
(+)
n .
(b) EDR versus the number of antennas at BS.
Fig. 5: EDRs under the PJA.
we plot the CCDFs of d
(C)
1 , d
(N)
1 , dˆ1, dn, and d˜n to validate
the effectiveness of the approximations in (29) and (33) and
to provide a guideline on designing the decision threshold ǫ.
As shown in Fig. 4(a), d˜n approximates dn very well and we
can safely use the CCDF of d˜n, i.e., P˜F (ǫ), to approximate
PF (ǫ) as stated in Theorem 3. To determine a proper value
of ǫ, we can choose those values of ǫ such that P{d˜n > ǫ}
is sufficiently small while P{dˆ1 < ǫ} is close to 1. In this
way, the EDR can be controlled to be small. In Fig. 4(b),
we set τ = 8, and we plot the EDRs against the numbers of
PSs transmitted by Eve, i.e., K , under different power budget
of Eve. We choose ǫ such that P˜F (ǫ) = 10−3. As we can
see from 4(b), with the proposed distance-based method, the
BS can successfully identify y(L) from the effective channel
observation set while keeps the EDR to be generally small.
We also observe that even if the Eve increases its power or
transmits more PSs, the EDR appears to be robust and does
not change with the transmission strategies of Eve.
In Fig. 5, the EDRs under PJA are evaluated. In the
simulation, the parameters are set to be the same as those in
Fig. 4, unless specified. In Fig. 5(a), we set pL = 15 dBm and
τ = 5, and we plot the CCDFs of d
(+)
n when xn 6= x(L) and
xn+1 6= x(L), and when xn = x(L), respectively, to provide a
guideline on designing the decision threshold ǫ. As shown in
Fig. 5(a), the analytical upper bound accurately approximates
the simulation results if pE is large. In this case, we can
directly use P(F)PJA (ǫ) in (50) to design ǫ. When pE is small,
(a) Secrecy rates versus the powers of BS.
(b) Secrecy rates versus the powers of BS.
Fig. 6: Secrecy performance under the PSA.
P(F)PJA (ǫ) becomes a strictly upper bound on the simulation
results, and in this case, we do not need to restrict a small η due
to the gap between the upper bound and the exact value. In Fig.
5(b), we plot the EDRs versus the numbers of antennas at the
BS under different transmit power of Eve. We set η = 0.025
in the simulation. From Fig. 5(b), we observe that even though
the EDR increases with transmit power of Eve, the EDR still
keeps small when the power of the Eve becomes very high
(lower than 0.05 when pE = 35 dBm), which validates the
effectiveness of the proposed distance-based method.
We have to emphasize here that ensuring a small EDR is
very important for the proposed downlink secure transmission
scheme. This is because only when the BS successfully recog-
nizes y(L) can it estimates the channel of the LU. If a small
EDR is not guaranteed, it is possible that the BS mistakes
the illegitimate channel for the legitimate channel, which will
undoubtedly result in the private information leakage to Eve.
B. Secrecy performance
We have already shown that the BS can detect x(L) with
a low EDR in the previous subsection. In this subsection,
we evaluate the secrecy performance in terms of secrecy rate
under the proposed downlink secure transmission framework.
In Fig. 6, we plot the secrecy rates versus the downlink
transmit powers of the BS when Eve carries out PSA. In
the simulation, we set M = 48, τ = 5, pL = 10 dBm.
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The simulation results are obtained by averaging over 1000
random channel realizations. In each random trial, if the BS
makes an error decision on y(L), we directly set the secrecy
rate as 0. In Fig. 6(a), we set TL = TE = 1, θ¯L,1 = 0
◦,
θ¯E,1 = 2
◦, and θ(D)L,1 = θ
(D)
E,1 = 30
◦. In Fig. 6(b), we set
TL = TE = 2, θ
(D)
L,1 = θ
(D)
E,1 = θ
(D)
L,2 = θ
(D)
E,2 = 15
◦,
and θ¯L,1 = θ¯E,1 = 30
◦, and in each trial, θ¯L,2 and θ¯E,2
are independently and randomly generated within (−5◦, 5◦).
In Fig. 6, N = 1 corresponds to the conventional training
scheme wherein only one PS is allocated to the LU, and
N = 5 corresponds to the proposed training scheme wherein
5 PSs are simultaneously allocated to the LU. As we can
see, compared to the conventional training scheme, allocating
multiple PSs to the LU can greatly improve the secrecy rate.
This is because when N = 1, Eve can always hit the LU’s
PS, which leads to a poor performance of channel estimation.
However, when N > 1, due to the fact that Eve does not
know which PS the LU will transmit, it is possible for the
BS to obtain uncontaminated channel observations of both the
LU’s and Eve’s channels, which significantly improves the
accuracy of the channel estimations, and thus the secrecy rate
gets increased. Besides, we observe that the secrecy rate is
improved when the transmit power of Eve is increased from
10 dBm to 20 dBm. Note that this phenomenon is totally
different from that shown in [16]. In [16], the authors showed
that without protection on the channel training procedure,
Eve can always improve its wiretapping performance by
increasing its power. However, with the proposed channel
training scheme, if Eve increases its transmit power during the
channel training procedure, the BS will obtain more accurate
estimation of the illegitimate channel, which undoubtedly
degrades the wiretapping capability of Eve.
In Fig. 7, we check the performance of the proposed
secure downlink transmission framework under PJA. In the
simulation, we set M = 48, τ = 5, pL = 15 (dBm), pB = 20
(dBm), and η = 0.025. Besides, we consider an extreme
terrible case for the LU where RL = RE . In Fig. 7(a),
the spatially correlated channel model is adopted by setting
TL = TE = 1, θ¯L,1 = θ¯E,1 = 0
◦, and θ(D)L,1 = θ
(D)
E,1 = 30
◦.
In Fig. 7(b), we set RL = RE = IM . The achievable rates
of the LU and Eve, denoted by rL , ln(1 + SNRL) and
rE , ln(1 + SNRE), respectively, and the differences of the
achievable rates, denoted by ∆r , rL − rE , are used as the
performance metrics. We also provide the performance of the
conventional channel training (N = 1) and matching filter
(MF) beamforming data transmission scheme for comparison.
The simulation results are obtained by averaging across 1000
random channel realizations. As we can see in Fig. 7, in the
conventional channel training and MF beamforming transmis-
sion scheme, rE is generally very high, and even approaches to
rL when pE = 24 dBm. This means that the data transmission
suffers from serious signal leakage. The main reason accounts
for this phenomenon is that under the condition RL = RE ,
the BS can hardly distinguish the legitimate channel from the
wiretap channel, and therefore, there is no way for the BS to
restrain the signal leakage. However, in the proposed channel
training and data transmission framework, rE is always much
(a) Achieve rates versus the powers of Eve.
(b) Achieve rates versus the powers of Eve.
Fig. 7: Secrecy performance under PJA.
lower than rL, and even approaches to 0 when pE = 24 dBm.
This is because with the proposed channel training scheme, the
BS is able to simultaneously estimate the legitimate channel
and the channel direction of the wiretap channel, based on
which zero-forcing beamforming can be utilized to greatly
reduce the signal power received by Eve. We also observe that
rL slightly decreases with the increase of pE . This is because
when pE gets large, the EDR also increase as shown in Fig.
5(b). This means that the probability that the BS mistakes the
illegitimate channel as the legitimate channel increases, and
therefore rL decreases accordingly.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a framework, including the RCT scheme and
the SB vector design, was proposed to combat with the PSA
and PJA during the channel training phase in a TDD system.
We hid LU’s PS by letting the LU randomly select a PS
to transmit. The BS can recognize LU’s PS by utilizing the
different channel statistics between Eve and the LU. It was
shown that though the BS does not know which PS will be
transmitted by LU in advance, it can correctly recognize it
with very high probability, even the channel statistics of Eve
is very similar to that of the LU. We showed that the secrecy
rate is remarkably increased when the proposed framework is
utilized.
At last, we have to point out that in this paper, we only
investigated the single-cell systems. When it comes to multi-
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cell systems, the PSs will be reused in multiple cells, and
the pilot contamination from the other cells will makes the
problem much more difficult and complicated. To combat PSA
and PJA in multi-cell situations will be one of our future
works.
APPENDIX
A. The Proof of Theorem 2
Define a unitary matrix Λ (x) , diag
(
IM , e
jxIM
)
. Be-
cause hE is circular and symmetrical, we have P˜(2,2)EDR =
P
{
‖g˜1‖2 − ‖g˜2‖2 < 0
}
, where g˜1 , hL + β
(2)
PSAhE + z
(L),
g˜2 , ejω˜β
(2)
PSAhE + z
(E), and ω˜ , ω(E) − ω(L). Us-
ing Λ (x), we have P˜(2,2)EDR = P
{
g˜HΛ (π) g˜ < 0
}
, where
g˜
,
[
g˜H1 , g˜
H
2
]H ∼ CN (0,Rg (ω˜)) with
Rg (ω˜) , E
(
g˜g˜H
)
=
[
R
(2)
L,E,z e
−jω˜R(2)E
ejω˜R
(2)
E R
(2)
E,z
]
= Λ (ω˜)Rg (0)Λ (−ω˜) . (53)
Therefore, we further have
P˜(2,2)EDR = P
{
g˜H (Rg (ω˜))
− 12 (Rg (ω˜))
1
2 Λ (π)
× (Rg (ω˜))
1
2 (Rg (ω˜))
− 12 g˜ < 0
}
= P
{
g˜HΛ (ω˜) (Rg (0))
− 12 (Rg (0))
1
2 Λ (π)
× (Rg (0))
1
2 (Rg (0))
− 12 Λ (−ω˜) g˜ < 0
}
= P {αHWα < 0} , (54)
where α , (Rg (0))
− 12 Λ (−ω˜) g˜ and W ,
(Rg (0))
1
2 Λ (π) (Rg (0))
1
2 . Note thatW does not depend on
ω. As for α, it can be easily checked that E
{
ααH
}
= I 2M .
B. The proof Lemma 1
We first show that EX,Y
{
ln
(
1+X
1+Y
)}
and ln
(
1+EX{X}
1+EY {Y }
)
have a common lower bound as follows,
EX,Y
{
ln
(
1 +X
1 + Y
)}
(a)
≥ ln
(
1 +
1
EX {1/X}
)
− ln (1 + EY {Y })
(b)
≤ ln
(
1 + EX {X}
1 + EY {Y }
)
, (55)
where step (a) is obtained by applying Jensen’s inequal-
ity to convex functions ln
(
1 + 1x
)
and ln
(
1
1+x
)
, and step
(b) is because EX
{
1
X
} ≥ 1
EX{X} . Now we show that
EX,Y
{
ln
(
1+X
1+Y
)}
and ln
(
1+EX{X}
1+EY {Y }
)
have a common upper
bound as follows,
EX,Y
{
ln
(
1 +X
1 + Y
)}
(a)
≤ ln (1 + EX {X})− ln
(
1 +
1
EY {1/Y }
)
(b)
≥ ln
(
1 + EX {X}
1 + EY {Y }
)
, (56)
where step (a) is due to the fact that ln (1 + x) and
− ln (1 + 1x) are concave functions, and step (b) is because
EY
{
1
Y
} ≥ 1
EY {Y } . As we can see, EX,Y
{
ln
(
1+X
1+Y
)}
and ln
(
1+EX{X}
1+EY {Y }
)
has the same upper and lower bound,
and thus we can use ln
(
1+EX{X}
1+EY {Y }
)
to approximate
EX,Y
{
ln
(
1+X
1+Y
)}
.
C. Proof of Theorem 5
The derivation of Theorem 5 is given as follows,
P
{
d
(+)
PJA,n > ǫ
}
= P
{
min
a
‖µnβPJAhE + zn
− a (µn+1βPJAhE + zn+1) ‖2 > ǫ
}
(a)
≤ P
{
‖zn − µnzn+1/µn+1‖2 > ǫ
}
(b)
= τ2
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
0
e−τ(x+y)
Γ
(
M, ǫxσ2z(x+y)
)
Γ (M)
dxdy
(c)
= τ2
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
v
e−τu
Γ
(
M, ǫvσ2zu
)
Γ (M)
dudv
(d)
= τ2
∫ +∞
0
∫ u
0
e−τue
− ǫ
σ2zu
v
M−1∑
m=0
(
ǫ
σ2zu
)m
vm
m!
dvdu
(e)
= τ2
∫ +∞
0
e−τu
M−1∑
m=0


σ2zu
ǫ
−
m∑
k=0
uk
(
ǫ
σ2zu
)k−1
e
ǫ
σ2z k!

 du
=
σ2zM
ǫ
−
M−1∑
m=0
m∑
k=0
(
ǫ
σ2z
)k−1
e
ǫ
σ2z k!
. (57)
In (57), step (a) is obtained by setting a = µnµn+1 , step (b)
is because ‖zn − µnzn+1/µn+1‖2 ∼ G
(
M, |µn+1|
2+|µn|2
|µn+1|2
)
when µn and µn+1 are fixed, and |µn|2 ∼ E
(
1
τ
)
and
|µn+1|2 ∼ E
(
1
τ
)
, step (c) is obtained by x + y → u and
x → v, step (d) is obtained by using [38, Eq. (3.3512)], and
step (e) is obtained by using [38, Eq. (3.3511)].
D. CCDF of quadratic formula of Gaussian random vector
We provide an expression for P {xHΩx > t} in this ap-
pendix, where t ≥ 0, x ∼ CN (0, IL), and Ω ∈ CL×L
is an indefinite Hermitian matrix. Denote s(1,1) < s(1,2) <
· · · < s(1,n1) as the n1 distinct positive eigenvalues of Ω
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with algebraic multiplicities given by m1,1,m1,2, · · · ,m1,n1 ,
respectively. Denote s(2,n2) < s(2,n2−1) < · · · < s(2,1) as the
n2 distinct negative eigenvalues of Ω with algebraic multi-
plicities given by m2,n2 ,m2,n2−1, · · · ,m2,1, respectively. We
have
P {xHΩx ≥ t} = P {xHUDUHx ≥ t}
= P {µHDµ ≥ t}
= P {Q1 −Q2 ≥ t}
=
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
y+t
fQ1 (x) fQ2 (y) dxdy,
where UDUH = Ω is the eigenvalue decomposition, and
µ , UHx ∼ CN (0, IL) ,
Q1 ,
n1∑
i=1
G1,i, Q2 ,
n2∑
j=1
G2,j ,
G1,i ∼ G1,i
(
m1,i, s
(1,i)
)
, i = 1, 2, · · · , n1,
G2,j ∼ G2,j
(
m2,j,
∣∣∣s(2,i)∣∣∣) , j = 1, 2, · · · , n2.
According to [36], the PDF of Qq , for q ∈ {1, 2}, can be
written as
fQq (x) = I{x>0}
∞∑
k=0
δ¯q,kx
ρq+k−1∣∣s(q,1)∣∣ρq+k Γ (ρq + k) e
− x|s(q,1)| ,
where for q ∈ {1, 2}, δ¯q,k , Cqδq,k, Cq ,
∏nq
i=1
(
s(q,1)
s(q,i)
)mq,i
,
δq,k+1 , 1k+1
∑k+1
i=1 iγq,iδq,k+1−i, δq,0 , 1, γq,k ,∑nq
i=1
mq,i
k
(
1− s(q,1)
s(q,i)
)k
, and ρq ,
∑nq
i=1mq,i. Based on
fQq (x), we have∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
y+t
fQ1 (x) fQ2 (y) dxdy
=
∫ +∞
0
∞∑
k2=0
δ¯2,k2y
ρ2+k2−1e
− y|s(2,1)|∣∣s(2,1)∣∣ρ2+k2 Γ (ρ2 + k2)
×
∫ +∞
y+t
∞∑
k1=0
δ¯1,k1x
ρ1+k1−1e
− x|s(1,1)|∣∣s(1,1)∣∣ρ1+k1 Γ (ρ1 + k1)dxdy
=
∞∑
k1=0
∞∑
k2=0
δ¯1,k1 δ¯1,k2∆k1,k2 (t) . (58)
where due to the fact that ρ1 and ρ2 are integers, ∆k1,k2 (t)
can be written as (59) at the top of the next page. Inserting
∆k1,k2 (t) into (58), we obtain
P {xHΩx > t} = ∞∑
k2=0
∞∑
k1=0
δ¯1,k1 δ¯1,k2
ρ1+k1−1∑
i=0
e
− t|s(1,1)|
i!
×
∣∣∣∣s(2,1)s(1,1)
∣∣∣∣
i i∑
l=0
(
l
i
)(
t∣∣s(2,1)∣∣
)i−l
Γ (ρ2 + k2 + l)
Γ (ρ2 + k2)
×
( ∣∣s(1,1)∣∣∣∣s(1,1)∣∣+ ∣∣s(2,1)∣∣
)ρ2+k2+l
. (60)
For the special case of t = 0, we have
P {xHΩx > t} = ∞∑
k2=0
∞∑
k1=0
δ¯1,k1 δ¯1,k2
ρ1+k1−1∑
i=0
1
i!
× Γ (ρ2 + k2 + i)
Γ (ρ2 + k2)
∣∣∣∣s(2,1)s(1,1)
∣∣∣∣
i
×
( ∣∣s(1,1)∣∣∣∣s(1,1)∣∣+ ∣∣s(2,1)∣∣
)ρ2+k2+i
. (61)
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